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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States.
OCTOBER TERM,

A. D. 1916.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
..4.ppel'lant,
1)8.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
et al.,

Appenee,.

SUGGESTIONS OF AN AMICUS CURIAE,
CONTAINING:
I.
Application for Leave to File.
II. A Brief of the Argument.
m. Analysis of the "Standard Oil" Decision.
IV. Criticism of "Northern Securities" Ruling. (Annexed).

BY
HARRY S. MECARTNEY.
BARNARD 6

MILLIIIR PRINT, CHICAGO.

'

Il'I' THE

~uprrmt illnurt nf tqr lluitrh ~tatr.a.
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Tuv, A. D. 1916.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
.Appellant,

No.

,s1.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
et al.,
Appellees.

I.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUGGESTIONS
AS AN AMICUS CURIAE.

And now comes Hany S. Mecartney, of Chicago,
Illinois, a member of the bar of this court, and herewith makes application to the court for leave to file
in above cause the suggestions and brief data annexed hereto as an amicus curiae.
H ARRY S. MECARTNEY.
Suggestions.

cl)

,t
rf)

We believe that the original idea of an arnicus
curiae was a barrister at large who, from the vantage ground of an impartial observance, had noticed
a grave error on the part of the court, either committed or imminent, and felt impelled to attempt to
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save the court, the profession and the public from
the threatened consequences.
Of late years an amicus curiae is usually thought
of as one interested in the pending issue only as
counsel for another who, though not a party to the
cause, is financially interested in the outcome ; and
hence, such counsel is frequently thought of, primarily at least, as an amicus, more of somebody's particular interests than of the court.

If there be any class of cases in which the court
could use to special advantage the services of an
amicus curiae in the original sense of the term, it
would seem to be the class to which the present case
belongs. For, it is in these overwhelmingly important or turning-point cases-those that affect the
com,mon life and the common interests of the people
at large-that the judges most frequently divide
in their opinions. Hence it is in this class of cases
that erroneous rulings are more apt to result.
This divergence in opinion can be largely explained or accounted for by the familiar truth that
it is such life issues which put the heaviest strain
upon our judgment, because they usually involve a
breaking away from lifelong habits of thought and
experience.
But such a result is chiefly accounted for by the
insufficient or narrow presentation to the court of
the issues involved, even though frequently our legal
giants appear to advance the pros and cons of the
argument. The modern succes~ful lawyer is always
"busy," always "rushed," and has not time for fullest meditation.
It so happens that in the Standard Oil case,_221
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U. S. 1, presenting the very issue here involved, the
Chief Justice formally and almost sadly commented
upon the fact that in the briefs and arguments submitted by the very eminent counsel in the case there
was '' no real point of agreement on any view of the
act," or as to the la;w, or as to the facts. And it
would Seem that this formal deliverance of the court
is alone and of itself a strong ''item'' to prove the
claim of the usefulness of "neutral" counsel in this
class of cases.
So, too, while the position of the Government's
counsel is supposedly at least technically "neutral"
in all these cases, nevertheless such counsel are
usually heavily overburdened with exacting and varied duties. It is, too, an open secret that when a
public issue becomes acute and affects the entire nation at large, it naturally becomes a feature of political debate and of general discussion,
and gradually furnishes, too, a prominent ''plank''
in political campaigns. It must of necessity follow
that thoughtlessly and unconsciously the '' administration' '-and hence its counsel-becomes a sort of
champion .or sponsor for one or the other side of the
question; and this may occasionally tend to narrow
its presentation. It is, in fact, lamentably true that
upon the day after the publication of the Northern
Securities' decision the press widely published a
conference at the White House in which the then
President expressed his great gratification over the
"victory" which the administration had just "won"
-a victory which, by the way, was seemingly renounced by him in later years.
All this would seem to prove that in this class of
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cases there is a natural niche of usefulness to fill by
the services of a neutral "amicus."

We also submit that, in cases like the preseut,marking as they do crises in industrial progress, and
calling in fact for an outlining of new national industrial policies-the nece ity of the early settlement of
such issues, or at least prompt relief from the concrete crisis, should be more fully recognized even in
the judicial forum than is usual. It in fact behooves
the counsel engaged to consider and point the '' way
out" of the difficulties.
As our eminent Philadelphia brother, Mr. Johnson, lately said upon his argument in the Adamson
Law case: '' The real issues here should be settled; they should be settled now; but let us settle
them in a statesmanlike way."
And we have little doubt that if a few men of the
marvelous ability and attainments of our eminent
brother had the time to contribute their statesmanship, had the time to tender their fullest and most
independent efforts and suggestions towards accomplishing the settlement of the public issues involved
in these grave cases in which they should be retained from time to time, the divisions in this
court in such cases would be heavily reduced from
the prevailing ratio-and error in the court's judg-•
ments extremely rare; and there would therefore obviously be a minimum of need for ''neutral'' counsel
and rare occasions indeed for the tender of their
services.
In the Northern Securities case, however, this
same eminent brother tendered but little to this end

-although his brief, as usual, was a marvel of clear
ness in demonstrating the logic of the issues.
The issue of '' competition or co-operation'' was
not raised, and the latter word is almost if not entirely omitted from the briefs. The vision of the
epoch in this epoch-marking case was not revealed.
Nor did the company or combination in defending
the legality of its existence admit its economic power, and then tender in argument its a.m enability to
regulation as a sufficient antidote to public fear of
the power, etc. It apparently did not want to b&
regulated.
The writer herewith submits data upon two main
features-controlling features-of the present case
The first claim was argued of course in the
Northern Securities case-for it was the main point
involved. It was overruled or denied in a ":five to
four'' decision. No petition f or rehearing was :filed.
In the Standard Oil case this same point was argued,
but indirectly, the opinion itself grouping the company's argument under two heads only: First, lack
of jurisdiction in Congress, and, second, lack of '' due
process" of law, etc. And no appeal was made to
the court to recall the : 'Securities'' ruling. It wa1::1
simply sought to escape it-to '' get around'' it.
The privilege to openly attack this same ruling is
again waived in the briefs :filed in the present case;
and it has been waived also in the oral arguments.
We believe, however, that the suggestions tendered
below in criticism of the Securities ruling (written
in 1904-5 and annexed separately), are chiefly new,
and that if the arguments below be permitted to be
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filed, they will also constitute the first open attack
upon the Standard Oil decision.
The second claim-affecting the relief to be
granted-is seemingly absolutely new ground, and
has not been passed upon in any way, shape or form,
nor submitted to the court, in the prior "trust"
cases.
As some color or warrant for disturbing the
court or justices in this case, and attempting to
''break into'' the ordinary curriculum, etc., the
writer tenders the following:
1. That he is absolutely neutral as to the issue.
No paid retainer in any similar case has ever been
received by him down to date, and he has no promise
or hope of any, direct or indirect. He submits the
suggestions herewith "without favor or hope of reward,'' except for the possible satisfaction of having
aided-be it never so humbly-the permanent settlement of a question which has long vexed our country and its judicial systems, and borne· heavily upon
its industrial welfare.
2. That, including an exhaustive criticism or
treatise of th~ Northern Securities opinion (128 pp.)
completed in March, 1905, he has devoted about or
over. eight months of professional labor to writing
upon this ''Trust'' issue.
3. That from time to time as the same was prepared, he bas placed his data before the counsel for
the Government and counsel for the corporations,
defendants in these several ''Trust'' causes.
The effort here made, therefore, bas not been
born of impulse; and we believe that a due reluc-
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tance to unnecessarily or prematurely bother the
court of the justices, has been observed.

We therefoi'e submit our feeble effort to prompt
the court to reconsider this great national issue, and
towards convincing it of the following:
1st. That there is no existing "law of competition" which if left alone automatically works for
good, or even for an increase of trade-any more
than the existing '' law of competition'' between the
"warring members" of our human nature automatically results in yielding to the temptation
and never in triumphing over it. No such concept therefore can be found in or "construed into"
the Sherman Act.
2d. That there is no point in the growth or
process of the combination of trade plants at which
the "power to ·control prices" passes to the
"Trust" or combination-as in the instance of obtaining the control of a corporation by the acquirement of a majority of its stock. For every trade
plant has some power to control, i. e., to influence
prices. And this influence in turn fluctuates from
day to day, as market conditions vary, and is widely variant in different articles or products.
In other words there is no point in such process of
combination or growth at which one becomes a
criminal and subject to fine and imprisonment.
Certainly at least such a point cannot (humanly
at least) be ascertained-unless fl.xed in advance
by positive enactment.
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That is to say :
The whole attempt of the court in these
"trust" cases to justify a decree upon the
basis of a "power to control prices" is an attempt to make a constant out of a variable.

3d. That this great lodestone of error in the sev~
eral rulings of recent years should b~ formally recognized, and the Northern Securities decision ( as
explained by the Standard Oil ruling) be squarely
and openly overruled.
(Seemingly no one has
yet tried to get it overruled.)
4th. That while a great industrial combination
which has grown great and powerful by evil and
oppressive trade practices may deserve dissolution, and while the court unquestionably has power
to decree its dissolution-nevertheless public
policy does not require or demand the entry of such
dissolution decrees. But on the contrary, such actual dissolution would be a great public calamity;
while a partial dissolution such as has been entered
in the Standard Oil and other late cases produces
little or no effect-and hence little or no good. ( pparently, it simply requires the keeping of more
books.)
5th. The warrant for the incorporation of great
industrial corporations is the "public value" or
benefit inherent in their opportunities, their functions-their size. The decree in such cases, therefore, should not destroy this inherent public value,
but should, so far as possible, cause the offending
entity to restore property unjustly taken, to
right financial wrongs committed, and to satis-

9
fy damages inflicted-both as to private parties
affected and as to the public and to the extent that

it is possible so to do.
6th. If its wrongs have been of such long standing and conditions have so changed that relief cannot be given-it cannot be helped-cert?inly not by
a dissolution decree. The court is not to blame.
7th. That relief from oppressive combinations
is to be had (1) by means of laws penalizing specific
trade wrongs, or acts, or practices (2) by actual
regulation of their trade practices through supervisory bodies, etc., and (3) by decrees of courts that
will require s atisfaction of wrongs committed.

Since the briefs in this case have just lately been
filed, and the oral arguments just :finished, we suggest that this application is made in ample time, because submitted in practically the earliest time at
which any colorable necessity therefor has occurred.
We submit, then, that the present case, for reasons
above and below given, presents a case of '' peculiar
circumstances,'' in which this court should receive
properly tendered efforts of an amicus curiae.
For it has full discretion so to do.
ern Securities case, 191 U. S. 555.)

(First North-

In conclusion, a word of '' personal privilege,''
as the parliamentarians say.
.lfor over a third of a century it has been my privilege to observe with many others, and with deepest
professional concern the gradually increasing havoc
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in American judicial rulings that our ultra-cheap
system of jurisprudence has been making. For a
number of years the court dockets at the large industrial centers of the country have been clogged up
to an alarming degree, and '' justice freely and without delay" has become in some places and in very
fact almost a byword or mockery. Six, eight and
ten-year lawsuits are a co111,mon thing!
Cheap ''costs'' have gradually led to cheap litigation, and this to "hasty " briefs and hasty decisions given under high pressure. The result of this
nation-wide condition, has of necessity been to throw
a great volume of cases upon this court, thus robbing it of time for fullest meditation upon each case
presented-which it ought to have and which in
earlier and simpler times it actually had.
For many years the writer with others has been
. appealing to local, State, and National Bar Associations to take cognizance of this general court situation and arm for a steady campaign of relief.
The justices of this court have been seemingly
straining every nerve for many years to catch up
more closely with its docket, in order to give more
prompt relief. But it is beyond human capacity. It
thus has felt called upon to grant practically no rehearings; and this means and inevitably means practically never to correct an error in the case in which
made.
This is a sad condition of affairs-and one for
which the court is not responsible and of itself cannot cure. But the situation calls loudly for relief.
(The writer hopes to continue to contribute his mite
to this end.)

11

But in the meantime, such a situation does not justify the assumption-apparently indulged in heretofore by the counsel engaged in these "trust" cases
-that the court, even though it rnay err, and ma;y
perceive its error, will not formally recall its ruling upon an issue of national import.
This is indeed a peculiar and false respect for the
court as such-to assume that it will not confess
error under any circumstances. For respect for the
court must go hand in hand with concern for its welfare and for the general accuracy of its decisions.
This general situation is only referred to here, as
a just explanation, at least in part, of a very strange
and very grievous court attitude in respect to this
national ''Trust'' issue; and as helping to place
primary responsibility therefor where it belongs,
viz. : upon the bar.
We respectfully submit that in the Northern Securities case we reached the '' parting of the ways,''
and were led into the wrong road and took a stride
in the direction of error. We must now retrace
our steps and take the other road.
For, '' as sure as is the law by which the millstone
sinks in the ocean,'' so sure is it that you can not
make a constant out of a variable. And it also
ought to be just that sure that in America men ought
not to be convicted of a crime, when there is no
means of humanly or consciously knowing when they
became guilty of one.
Respectfully submitted,
lliRRY

137 So. La Salle Street,
Chicago, March 20, 1917.

S.

MECARTNEY.
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II.
AN OUTLINE "BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT."
Preliminary.

In the fall of 1903, some time after the opm10n
in the Minnesota t J. S. Circuit Court had been delivered in the ''Northern ecurities'' case, the :writer
turned aside from ordinary professional labors to
solve for himself the then much mooted question of
the legality or ille_g ality of ''trusts,'' etc. The issue
was recognized as one that was to come into every·
lawyer's professional life in time; and so he pref erred to study the matter at first hand and to approach the issue as an "absolute neutral," and to
work out his convictions before a paid retainer might
possibly warp or handicap him in its solution.
(Incidentally: No paid retainer in a similar case
has ever been received by him down to date.)
The conclusion reached, after a study of the briefs
and of the question at large, was that the ruling of
the court, finding that the ''combination'' was illegal,
was erroneous.
After the decision of this court, in March, 1904,
had been rendered, affirming the judgment of the
Circuit Court (193 U. S. 197), he was prompted to
enlarge upon his prior work, and was tempted to attack what seemed to him the fallacies in Mr. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion.
The result was an elaborate if not fairly exhaustive document of 128 pages of print.
Copies of this docµment (bound in black seal) were
sent to the various justices of this court; as well as
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to various judges and lawyers within a limited
"reading circle" of the writer.
After analyzing the ruling of the majority opinion
and attempting to show its cardinal fallacy of petitio
principii as we saw it, we sought to account for the
mistake thus made ( outside of the long-standing
handicap of an abnormal ''docket'' burden upon the
court), as follows :
1st. The fact that large and powerful combinations had grown up in our country and caught us
with no sufficient regulatory equipment on hand,
and hence that the fear of the evil that could be done
or the oppression that could be inflicted by such combinations, seemingly led the court to go too far in its
laudable desire to protect the public therefrom.
2d. The fact that it was not pointed out by the
coun el in the case with any insistence, and was accompanied with no appeal that the then existing and
threatening condition called for immediate and legal
regulation of such large combines or monopolies; and
that hence "the way for relief" was not argued,
and not even definitely suggested in the briefs in the
cause.
3rd. It was then predicted that as surely as the
ruling in the Northern Securities case was attempted
to be applied to large corporations generally which
were similarly structured or formulated, disastrous
:financial results would follow.
The excuse for sending copies of this document
to the then justices of this court was the fact that if
the c~mrt had erred, it was, as usual, primarily the
fault of a too narrow presentation of the "ultimate'_'
issues, and that it then became a duty of the coun-
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sel in the cause to petition for a rehearing-which
had not been done in that case. And suggestion was
made that, no matter how few rehearings had been
granted by this court in the overwhelmingly heavy
docket which had oppressed it for many years, wherever a "five-to-four" opinion or division was in evidence in respect to a great public issue, it was urgent
that a rehearing of the question involved should be
had, and hence petitioned for.
Considering, therefore, the ominous nature of the
ruling, the overwhelming confusion and public loss
that was apt to follow from it, the writer felt that
as an "officer of the court" it was not inappropriate
to lodge with the justices a very earnest appeal that
the question in some form be reconsidered, and this,
as said above, was done, and the result was labeled "The 'Merger' case; A Petition for a Rehearing; An Appeal from the Younger Generation,'' etc.
(The document so labeled here and annexed hereto
consists of Part I of this so-called treatise, a few
pages of Part II and the ''Vision'' and '' Retrospect" at the end.)

\ Several years later, and in July, 1907, the writer
felt called upon-in view of the unsettled public and
"market" feeling about this issue-to make certain
suggestions to the American Bar Association (then
in prospect of having its annual meeting at Portland, Maine), to the effect that a cause of such widereaching importance was enough to prompt the efforts of one of its able committees to present '' a
case stated" involving this same "trust" issue to
the U. S. Supreme Court, and that it (being a neu-
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tral body) should formally appeal for a re-consideration of that issue before the confusion became
greater. ( Copies of the appeal were sent in advance of the meeting to each of the 3,000 members.)

In that document the writer predicted again that
if and when the Northern Securities doctrine should
be sought to be applied to corporations or combines
generally, "widespread disaster would result."
The motion for the Association to take this action
was lost.

It was only a eouple of months after this document had been prepared and distributed that the Government filed its information against the Tobacco
Company (it had sued the Standard Oil Company
some months before), and the government gave out
to the press a list of sev eral dozen of the largest industrial companies in the country which it had slated
for attack along the same lines.
And it so happened that immediately afterwards
the panic of October, 1907, occurred.

A year after this (1908) the writer prepared a document reciting briefly the then recent ''Trust'' history up to date, and sug~sting to the railroad counsel of the chief systems of the country (some 200 of
them were sent copies) that the roads or other large
combinations petition anew in some form for a reconsideration of the ''Trust'' issue in this court, and
seek to get the "Northern Securities" decision
overruled. Nothing came of this effort.
Some four years later the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases were decided, explaining or modifying
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the Northern Securities holding with a '' rule of
reason," but leaving the main basis of the prior ruling intact-and unatta.cked.

Over two years ago the writer was furnished with
full copies of the briefs in this so-called ''Steel''
case, then pending in the District Court of New Jersey, and about the same time received a copy of the
briefs in the present Harvester case, in which reargument has been lately had in this court.
He then prepared another brief document, bearing
upon the merits of question but which was chiefly an
attack upon the mode of relief which had been adopted
in these cases. He dwelt at large upon the fatuity
of entering these ''dissolution'' decrees in the matter of these big, valuable entities. He furnished
eopies of his "brief" to Judge Gary, of the Steel
Company, and to Judo-e Dickinson, the Government's
special counsel in the '' Steel case.''

We now come to the form in which these cases
(''Harvester'' and ''Steel'' cases) have been presented for argument in this court. We observe that
apparently no earnest effort has been made by the
corporations attacked to persuade this court (1),
that its ruling in the Northern Securities case, as
somewhat modified by its opinion in the Standard
Oil case, is wrong . Nor (2), has any effort been
made on the part of counsel for such companies to
convince the court that even if these combinations
have transgressed the Sherman law, said law did ,n,ot •
and could not require either their absolute or partial
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dissolution. That the law could not require the court
to needlessly cause great and abnormal public loss,
etc.
Therefore, having written and delved in a thorouo-hly neutral spirit in this issue for some thirteen
years or more with original convictions unshaken;
seeing the mischief grow; witnessing these vast
records coming to ·this court, any one of which is
enough to wreck a normal human mind in attempts
to master it; seeing able arguments of able men delivered upon an ever shifting· and elusive base,-it
seems to us that it is about time for some one to
raise a hand in protest. For the upheaval must
come some time and the longer delayed, the greater.
And having from time to time sent copies of the former data, prepared after many months of labor in
the aggregate, to counsel and parties on both sides
of these cases, we feel called upon, personally and
formally and openly and directly, to suggest to this
court the propriety of considering or reconsidering
both of these dominant issues.

If unprejudiced service, i. e., "neutral" service,
and hard and persistent work done without any expectation of financi l reward, is as acceptable to this
court as that which is usually done for a paid retainer, or as that frequently performed as
an amicus curiae by counsel for a ,p arty financially interested in the issue, we then are constrained
to point to the great labor given and the great expense incurred by the writer on this big issue as a
warrant for disturbing this court with an application
to file the briefs or suggestions submitted herewith.
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While it probably is not ncessary so to . do we
add an affidavit as to our personal non-interest, etc.,
in the subject.
STATE OF ILLINOIS,
CouNTY OF CooK.

l

5 ss.

HARRY S. MECARTNEY being duly sworn, deposes
and says that he has been _engaged in the practice
of law for over thirty-three years in Chicago; that
he has been a member of the bar of the United States
Supreme Court for over fifteen years.
Affiant further states that the statements above
made under the heading "Preliminary" substantially show the amount of time which affiant has spent
in various professional brief work and treatises
upon the subject ref erred to-namely, upon the question of the legality or illegality of combinations or
so-called trusts in trade; that the time spent in and
about said work, together with that spent in preparing for the application above and preparing the data
and brief work submitted herewith, has amounted
to about or above eight months.
Affiant further says that he has never been paid
or promised any retainer or law fees for the work
which has been thus done, nor for attempting to
appear in the present case, nor for preparing the
brief work or suggestions herewith submitted, nor
has he any expectation of any financial reward, direct or indirect, from the work which he has done
upon this issue, or in preparing the matter herewith
submitted.
Affiant further says that the briefs in the said
cause of United States v. United States Steel Car-
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po ration, were only filed a few days before the argument, and that he did not and does not deem that
any application to the court of the kind here made,
• have been appropriate until after the regular
would
briefs and arguments had been filed and made, for
not until then could it have been determined whether
the points or suggestions herewith tendered had been
covered by the regular counsel.

That affiant has worked continually since the briefs
in the cause were filed, in preparing the data herewith submitted and the same is submitted at the
earliest hour physically possible so to do.
Further affiant sayeth not.
HARBY

s.

MECABTNEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day
of March, A. D. 19.1.7.

EvANGELINE
(Seal)

STEWART'

Notary Public Cook County, Illinois.
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(I.)

The Error.

1. ''Combination'' is simply ''co-operation.''
That there is no "l(l,(UJ of competition," existing by
statute, existing in phy ics, or existing in human
nature, which law, if left alone automatically works
for good or even works for an increase of trade,
and which is violated by a statute passed in general
form prohibiting evil or wrong in trade, whether by
way of ''restraint'' or of inhibiting ''monopoly'' in
whole or "in part."
2. The formal edict of this court to the contrary
is error, and it should now be formally recalled, and
the Northern Securities decision, as well as the chief
ruling in the Standard Oil decision, should be squarely and openly overruled.
3. There is even no definite trade concept of
"competition" except that of independence, i. e., of
independent concerns engaged in certain lines of
trade.
4. If Congress meant by the Sherman Act to restrain all independent concerns engaged in trade
from joining their means or resources in trade, or
making any coalition for trade purposes, it could
have plainly and easily said so-but it is not hard
to imagine what this court would have done with.
such a law.
5. Although combinations in trade, or large c·o rporations engaged therein, have, or may have,
some power to oppress, it should be recognized that
relief from the threatened power of such combina-
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tions must be had through their regulation, through
penal laws directed at their acts of oppression, etc.,
and by dec1·ees causing restitution of property and
satisfaction of damages, etc.
6. The proposition that rnere size in an industrial
unit or organization is per se illegal is absolutely
unsound and fallacious.

If mere size in any particular trade industry be
ominous, it can only become illegal when a limit to
size is drawn in advance by some legislative edict.
7. A so-called ".trust" which has monopolized
a part-even a very large part-of a particular class
of trade or commerce of the country, can only be
attacked and dissolved when it
a,, actually has used unfair and oppressive
methods to attain its size or gain its position of
dominance in the trade; or b, where its declared
objects are unfair, oppressive, or illegal; or c,
where it is proven or admits that it intends to
commit such evils or wrongs.
8. The fundamental law of trade and the f 1tndamental encouragement to trade is to increase trade
by all possible legal and fair rr;i.eans. And when the
size of the trade factor-whether in corporate or
partnership or individual form-becomes large
enough to involve or possess the power to oppress,
it then challenges public regulation,-but not destruction.
9. If these be economic truths, they a.re presumably known to the public at large, and presumably
were so known at the time the Sherman Act was
passed. And the court in construing the Sherman
Act ( and its "general language") had no call and
no right to attribute an intention to Congress to run

22

counter to such truths and to our whole industrial
system and policy.
Nor had it any call or right to subst~tute an intention to preserve what it has been pleased to call
"reasonable competition," or, as the Government
counsel says, "our competitive system"-an ambulatory, undefined, and indefinite concept.
10. What would be thought of a law which proscribed not '' restraint of trade,'' not ''monopolistic''
practices but-'' any coalition of trading concerns,
which militated against the 'yreservation of our
competitive system' "I
And of an attempt to convict traders of a crime
upon the basis of such language!
· 11. And to find men guilty of a crime or "conspiracy" to do an act which is not per se a fraudulent or unfair trade act ( as, for instance, an instantaneous or sudden and oppressive or fraudulent
raising of prices), but which "unreasonably restricts,'' not trade,-but competition--is to convict
them of transgressing or going beyond an imaginary
line in growth. That is, to convict them for grow.
ing to a conspiracy-a point not defined in advance
and hence a point which no human agency can define.
So that the only way to absolutely avoid becoming
a conspirator would be to refuse to grow at all.
Legislation, it is true, can draw a point or line at a
definite size, i. e., definite amount of capital, or definite limits of territary or of time, or of amount of
bitsiness, etc., etc.
Admittedly, Congress has not done this.
12. Nor is any aid given to this effort by resorting
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to the common law (as this court attempted to do in
the Standard Oil case )-except to apply the common
law of "restraint of trade" practices, or monopoly
practices, i. e., "forestalling" or "engrossing" the
market, i. e., sudden and temporary and acute acts,
accompanied with an actual and definitely large
increase in prices, or accompanied with avowed or
admitted or undenied intent to enhance prices, etc.
And such offenses usually affected the necessaries of
life in an age when there usually were scant supplies
of these and rarely indeed a surplus.

13. Even these acts at common law were not pretended to be covered by general principles, but by
specific legislation; and even such statutes were :finally repealed. As this court says in the Oil case, '' in
the changing conditions of society'' and of '' economic conceptions,'' it was :finally recognized that
frequently the result of engrossing, i. e.,. buying in
large quantities, etc., were not harmful but "tended
to fructify and develop trade." (P. 55.)
Is it not as easy for the court to find that in 1890
there existed '' economic conceptions'' in favor of
the idea that co-operation of large units is apt to
lower prices to the public and to increase trade, etc.1
To find that "co-operation" in the present conditions of society is as well recognized as cut-throat
competition?
14. .Apparently no case has been cited, or can be,
in ·which any one was convicted at common law under such specific statutes {which actually furnished
their own standard, viz., sudden and acute acts of
oppression, etc.), and where such acts were held to
make one guilty when they had actually been fol-

-
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lowed and perhaps followed for months and years
with a reduction-instead of an enhancement-in
prices.
Evidently no authority at common law has been
cited where it was held that the power to raise prices
to any degree was itself and in principle the actual
raising of prices.
15. '' Restraint of trade,'' i. e., fraudulent restraint of trade, and "monopolistic practices," is a
definite concept and sufficient to fix guilt. But a
· fraudulent growth, whether accomplished by gradual increase by the purchase of plants or by association of partnerships or corporations-in a jurisdiction where specific statittes al,low such growthcannot be conceived for a moment. There is no given
point in growth which can rnark the line between innocence and conspiracy.
There is no common law ruling that joining con
cerns in trade constitutes "engrossing" or a,
''monopolistic'' act.''
16. The error in the Standard Oil decision ( tho
fullest exposition of the view of the court on the sub ject), consisted chiefly in this :
(a) Admitting that the Sherman Act-providing
against a conspiracy, i. e., against a crime-waf',
drafted "in general language"; admitting that thi~
criminal statute was so vague that "it required that.
some stamdard should be resorted to," i. e., sitpplied
by the court in construction, etc.,-the court supplied
the wrong standard;
(b) The court attempted to supply '' the stand •
ard of reason" which had been "applied at the com
mon law.'' But instead of defining that standard as
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affecting unreasonable or fraudulent '' enhancement
of prices" or other fraudulent and specific acts, or
"monopolistic practices," it passed by the only definite and valid standard supplied by the common law,
and was led to seize upon a supposed line between
''reasonable'' and '' unreasonable restraint of competition."
(c) It failed then to test out th.e only '' competi- .
tion'' concept produced by the c.ommon law, namely: an unlimited restriction of one's right to engage
in a trade by making a special contract, therefor.
And in such instance the "reasonabhmess" or "unreasonableness'' of any proposed limitation in such
a contract was tested by a definite territory, a definite
period of time, or a definite amount of business, etc.,
etc.
The Sherman Act furnishes none of these limits in
its supposed protection of ''competition. ''
17. The formation of this big combine, no matter
how big it was, was simply a step in the growth of
the industry. It was not any greater in proportion
than perhaps thirty or forty ''steps'' similar or substantially similar, taken amongst the antecedents of
the very subsidiary corporations. And it apparently has not been claimed by the government that the
stockholders in the holding company have made any
greater profit, or at least any greater rate of profit,
by reason of the step thus taken than the stockholders of the subsidiary companies had made years before in taking advantage of the same or identical
strictly legal invitation of their respective states to
join plants or consolidate corporations for the pitrpose of increasing their trade.
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It is no remarkable or unique thing for the assets
of a corporation to increase in a period of over 16
years in the proportion of 3 to 1-especially in a fast
developing industry.
18. In other words, if Congress desired to make
it criminal for a corporate industry to grow, either
by purchase of plants or by consolidation of companies and industries, it should have drawn the line
at a certain amount of capital-as in the instance of
the present Missouri statute-or at a certain amount
of business or trade carried on (as ascertained by
some furnished tests or reports to be made), etc.,
etc., or by territory to be covered-and too, perhaps specifically define the trade, the article, or kind
of products, etc., etc.

19. The mere incident of a "holding company" is
unconsciously seized upon to bolster up the concept
of unfair or fraudulent growth, etc. But if such plan
is a legal plan and legally chartered by one of the
states, one cannot find guilt in this device. It could,
it is true, furnish some evidence of intent connected
with a fraudulent act or practice. But it, being legal, cannot help out the variable and shifting element of size or growth, to the extent of fixing guilt.
20. But more than this: Why is not the corporate
device of a "holding" company a logical and legitimate one for the efficient and economical direction
of a mammoth industry with various and varied
plants in many states T
Were our country a single state, one large corporation with plant or territorial "departments"
might be as satisfactory to deal with from the standpoint of a single government or a single regulatory
body created by it.
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But in a government of separate states, with a
national government superimposed upon them, the
situation is different.
In fact, ea.ch state as is well known prefers to
--deal with a large local industry through a corporation of its own creation. And sometimes the local
restrictions or regulations are so many or complex
as to suggest or compel local incorporation in the
interest of simplicity and directness.
21. Again: Independently of this dual government feature, the holding company is probably the
best if not the only satisfactory device for an economic control over the associated plants and industries and their output, in the way of territorial supply of trade and the distribution of orders, etc., to
the best advantage of all concerned-and hence, it
is, certainly it may be, the best device to develop
the largest increase of trade.
The holding company may involve increased power-but hand in hand ·with this goes power to in-crea-se trade.
22. The ominousness of a holding company is a
factor in economic power-and hence, it is a factor
of economic pitblic advantage.
In other words, the bigger the economic giant and
the more power he has, the more does he challenge
regulation. But if we destroy "the goose that lays
the golden egg"-we simply lose the egg.
23. The holding company feature cannot be seized
upon to support the idea that it '' unduly restricts
competition" as an individual did at common law
when he placed by contract an .unlimited restraint
upon his right to work or do business.
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24. Nor does the word "perpetual" (used in
Standard Oil decision .... ) , add anything to the situation. The holding company is no more "perpetual" than its charter; and that charter no more perpetual than others.
25. Of convincing significance is the fact, that in
Canada, England, France and Germany, the economic value in size itself, in certain lines of industry
has long been recognized, and size has been encouraged-but at the same time actively regitlated. How
would Germany have so vastly increased her foreign trade in iron and steel in the last 20 years had
she had only small plants as formerly-in other
words, had she ' ' preserv ed'' at all hazards her
" competit,ive system?" For the attorney general
tells us that ours must be so preserved, and that this
was the object of Congress in passing the Sherman
Act. And all the headings in his brief hover around
or are based upon this one idea.
26. If the "holding" company is peculiar to our
country, and if there be anything ungainly, or awkward, or unnecessarily cumbersome in this feature
of large industrial development and power-it arises
from our dual system of government-national and
state, and this gives it its uses or its warrant of
necessity.
27. The plea made in our "Northern Securities"
or "merger" treatise or criticism to the effect that
the safety valve of relief from the threatened power
of large industrial combinations lies in active supervision and regulation, and the effectiveness and sufficiency thereof has been borne out by the legislation
passed since, viz : In the broadened powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and its practical
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working for nearly or quite 10 years past, and by
the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission.
The destructive decrees-i. e., theoretically destructive at least-such as have been entered in the
late ''Trust'' cases are not needed now to deter men
from doing the unreasonable-even if they ever did
have any substantial effect so to do. The scepter of
"regulation" and "restraint" against oppressive
practices is now ever above them and in plain sight.

2 . In conclusion:

We cannot make a constant out of a variable.
( 2) The only "restraint of trade" which this
statute (Sec. 1) furnishes as a constant, is restraint
of trade by fraudulent acts or practices-as, for
instance, an undue or fraudulent raising of prices to
the consuming public. This can be so great and sudden as to be a guilty act.
(3) Tbe only constOJnt furnished by the prohibition against '' monopolizing the whole or any part
of" the trade in any article of trade (Sec. 7) is a
prohibition of "monopolistic practices, such as enhancement of prices"-which this court in the Standard Oil opinion calls one of the things spoken of
'' as monopoly'' itself.
(1)

( 4) If in interpreting the statute we bold it to
mean anything more than these two different concepts, we are bound to hold it to be a wholesale prohibition against all persons or corporations engaged
in trade from associating or combining their plants
even for business, i. e., trade purposes.
( 5)

A holding company is a legal entity and can
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not furnish a test nor help to draw a line to help out
this general statute. It is not interdicted, or condemned.
( 6) The concept of a "control of prices" will
not help. In many lines of trade a concern which
does 30 per cent. or 40 per cent. of the entire trade,
could produce more e:ffec upon the market than one
in another line doing 80 per cent. of the business in
its general line.
(II.)

The Relief.

Our second main proposition is this :

29. That where such combination or corporation
has actually oppressed the public, or its competitors,
by unfair trade methods or practices in trade, and
has perhaps grown to its position of trade power
largely as the result of such evil practices, and
while
(1.) Such facts of evil growth may be presumptive evidence of an intent to further oppress ( as held in the Standard Oil case) ; and
while
(2.) Such combination may deserv e dissolution; and while
(3.) The court has power to dissolve such a
quasi monopoly, yet
(4.) There being an inherent public value in
the combination itself-its entity, its functions, its very size-

A proper and wholesome decree in such case do es
not involve a dissolution of the combine, and the destruction of this public value. But such decr ee
should require the offending "trust" to restore to
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private parties wronged the property or money
wrongfully taken from them, or to satisfy the damages committed, so far as it is possible to do so.
And as to public wrongs the decree should require
that the property of the offending trust be turned
out or over to public authority to satisfy any statutory fines or other public claims. And where such
public loss is reasonably certain or can be estimated
in amount with reasonable approximation, the decree should require the payment of such amount into
the public treasury-the cy pres representative of
the public :finances, etc.-in satisfaction of such damages or loss.
30. If it be said t~at such a proceeding would be
l~vying fines in equity, etc., it is answered, Not so:
That equity of necessity must have full jurisdiction
in cases of such nature to require wrongs to be satisfied; and that no company or incorporated enterprise which has forfeited its right to live and has by
its practices formally invited its dissolution, can
complain of the court's conditioning its continued
existence upon such terms or any other reasonable
terms-as an alternative to the exercise of its power
to dissolve, i. e., destroy.
31. If the concern shall have grown so big and its
industrial ramifications shall have become so wide
and extensive, and if its tentacles have gradually
reached so deep into the body politic, and the concern has become so great that the dissolution thereof
would cause immense and staggering public inconvenience, confusion and loss (as this court intimated
was the case with the Standard Oil Company), that is
the greater reason why the court should require sat-
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is/action of wrongs,. public and private, for past misdeeds, rather than decree such dissolution.
32. If, on the other hand, "the trust" or entity,
attacked should defy the decree and voluntarily resign its functions rather than submit to such termsan unlikely thing in any case-then there would be
nothing for the court to do but to appoint r,eceivers
for the property to collect the amounts levied by its
decree, and to conduct the business until the company should be wound up under ordinary proceedings or at least until its property should be sold
out to individuals or corporations for continuance of
the business, etc., etc.
33. If its wrongs shall have been of long standing;and if repeated and specific remedies or relief or sat:.
isfaction for past misdeeds cannot be safely decreed
-then it is not the fault of the court, but of the people at large or their representatives in Congress in
failing to provide a regulatory body, or necessary
preventative measures, etc.
34. And it is obvious that, in any event, a decree
of dissolution which neither collects for damage
done nor gives relief for wrongs committed, and
which also fails to actually dissolve and which
does not reduce the actual size of the so-called monopoly, or which does not bring about a reduction in
the so-found oppressive prices or restrain other acts
of oppression, etc., can be of no particular public
benefit, from any point of view.
35. If the Government shall have failed to establish a regulatory body in due season and if private
parties concerned have failed to make timely com~
plaint of wrongs committed, or while it was prac--
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ticable for the court to give relief, this cannot warrant this court or any other court in entering either
a futile decree or a drastic one, viz. : one decreeing
di solution-and per sea public loss and injury. ·
36. The whole trend of legislation of late years
in the way of enlargement of the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission, together
with the apparent neglible results of these dissolution decrees, etc., etc., all seem to prove clearly that
the court in its "trust" rulings both as to merits and
methods of relief has simply taken the wrong road
and should retrace its steps.

Had this court found as facts in the Standard. Oil case :
NOTE.

That such combination had attained its form
and size and position of industrial power
throiigh a long and persistent policy and purpose of
unfair elim,ination of rivals; through receipt of illegal rebates on freight, and other illegal practices
and trade acts; had oppressed the public either generally or in special districts or places; had defied the
decree of di solution of the Ohio Supreme Court,
and had escaped any legally prescribed fines or penalties of that or other state courts, etc., etc., and
Had the court then as a condition for the company
and its subsidiaries ( tied up by contract or
corporate form with this tainted combine) to continue to do interstate business required them to
turn over their property or a portion of it sufficient
to amply sati fy all fines, or demands, public anrl pri-
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vate, which a decree could reach, and to turn ovc1
property to the jurisdiction of the local courts whenever necessary to carry out and satisfy their decrees,
etc., etc.; and
In the alternative :'
That receivers should be appointed for the com.
bine and its constituents and their properties duly
administered in the interest of the public and parties
wronged, to satisfy the entire situation, etc., etc.;
We say: had such a decree been entered, we fail to
see how any one could validly complain of it.
But the court in its decision in that case finds that
the Sherman Act was violated merely by the taking
of strictly legal steps to increase trade and to get increased economic power ( as every one does who
takes on a new plant) and then finds that the fraudulent trade acts committed merely emphasized such a
conclusion-instead of making them the sole basis
for a decree.
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m.
An Analysis of the Standard Oil Decision.

221 U. S.1.
In this cause, strangely enough, no appeal was
made by the counsel for the defendant companies
that the Northern Securities ruling be formally and
openly overruled.
In fact, a cursory reading of one of the briefsthe one of 190 pages-submitted by Mr. Johnson
and others-does not reveal even a deliberate reference to the decision.
The court, in order to apply its prior ruling to the
immense record, sought with commendable earnestness, to :find a :fixed ''standard'' which it said '' the
statute demanded'' i. e., demanded that the court
supply this standard-i. e., owing to the "general
language of these (its) provisions."
And what standard did the court supply?
Seizing upon the idea that there was a line between ''teasonableness'' and '' ,u nreasonableness''i. e., hunting for a constant on which to convict-it
sought refuge in a "rule of reason."
And then what '' rule of reason'' did it find ?
·Not the rule which revealed a line between areasonable or unreasonable (i. e., fraudulent) act.; but
it attempted to draw a line between a reasonable and
unreasonable growth in trade.
It did not hold to a test of "restraint of trade/'
the concrete subject of the statute (Sec. 1), butto one involving "competition"; i. e., it attempted
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to draw a line between reasonable and unreasonable
competition.
The advantage of deserting the specific subject of
the statute for another, and then returning to the
subject after reasoning out the matter, added nothing but indirection to the process. And '' indirection is seldom safe.''
That is to say : The court, instead of drawing or
indicating the line between a reasonable ( or. fair)
and unreasonable ( or fraudulently high) price, or
between a fair and an oppressive trade act-drew its
so-called line between a reasonable and an unreasonable growth or size. And this, too, in a country
whose corporate laws expressly, and whose industrial policy undeniably allowed all the growth or size
desirable or which could affect trade or promote the
greatest trade!

It was to be assumed, said the court in effect,
that the intention of Congress was--not to prohibit
unreasonable prices, unreasonable trade, "forestalling" or "engrossing" the market with avowed intent to enhance prices (a ternporary or specific
act) ; it was not against temporary or acute
acts which would oppress the people and unreasonably "restrain trade" and thus imply and safely imply guilt, and hence justly make the parties subject to
fine and imprisonment, etc., etc.-but the law was
passed to preserve due or reasonable ''competition''
to preserve '' our competitive system' '-as the brief
of the Attorney General claims; and, as he lately argued in the Harvester case-'' to preserve the small
dealer," etc., etc.
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Then the court as to Section 2, of the act, and in
order to satisfy the ''demand'' for a ''standard,''
proceeds to reason thus:
That "monopoly" in the strict technical and original sense of the term (meaning a legal grant to one
to monopolize all the trade in a certain article, and
this of course being a prohibition against others engaging in such trade), had not existed in England
for many years, and never had existed in America ;
that after legal monopolies had been abolished in
England the term ''monopoly'' had gradually in
common speech (in England as well as in America),
become to be frequently used to denote the '' resurlts of monopoly and monopolistic practices,"
such as '' forestalling, engrossing,'' etc., and particularly "the forced enhancement of prices" (all
sudden, temporary or acute acts which can imply
.guilt) ; that hence these terms, viz.: '' forestalling
ap.d engrossing" and "enhancement of prices" must
be supposed to have been in the minds of Congressevidently because they could furnish the much needed ''standard'' ''demanded'' by the act.
The court then, to support this view, is led to cite
but one English case, viz.: Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, A. C. 25 (1891), in which the plaintiff claimed damages from a combination-not one
that had raised rates or enhanced prices, etc. It was
an association or combination of ship owners who
were doing a large part of the trade in ships between
several Chinese ports and Europe. The association
had greatly lowered prices and given special if.1.ducements to shippers to ship exclusively by its vessels,
and thus it was able to increase its trade and dr:aw
the same from its competitor, plaintiff. Plaintiff
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claimed that he had been ruined, or threatened with
ruin, by the loss of trade which thus had been drawn
to defendants by the ruinous prices and special inducements, etc.
The whole argument of the various opinions of
the Lord Justices was that one could not complain of
"competition" or of combination that resulted ot ·
was intended to result in prices far below even a reasonable or 'living' figure."
But it was not ruled that an agreement between
rivals in trade to charge only a certain price, which
might be found to be reasonable, and for a limited
time or territory, was illegal (as held in Am. Joint
Traffic and Trans.-Mo. F 'r eight Assn. cases). Much
less was it ruled· that the combination of the ship
lines for the purposes of trade was illegal simply
because it carried "a power to control prices" and
therefore '' unduly restricted competition.''
It was not ruled that the association of plants or
lines was per se illegal or fixed guilt on the parties
accused. And such citation seems strangely inadequate to support any proposition of the kind. The
decision was to the effect that even a combination
between trade units by which their assets and capital were added together for the very purpose of increasing their own trade and eliminat.ing competition, was not a '' restraint of trade'' or '' a monopoly "-either in a legal or common speech sense.
The whole 470 pages of briefs on the law in this
Standard Oil case-tendering this court over 400 citations-and the 620 pages of briefs on the facts,
were seemingly tendered this court with no
claim (that is, with no open and formally expressed
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claim) that the Northern Securities opinion was
erroneous, and with no appeal to have said decision
overruled. And the basis of that opinion was attempted to be disturbed only by arguments which
here and there conflicted with the reasoning of the
decision-but for some reason or other lacked this
candid and formal appeal. And although the cause
was reargued, it was seemingly reargued upon the
same basis as originally submitted; and, as in the
Northern Securities case, no petition for rehearing
was filed therein.

And so as to the briefs in the present case.
They are presented upon the basis that the
theory of the prior decisions, principally the Northern Securities ruling, as explained by the '' rule of
reason'' in the Standard Oil case is to control the
record.
In the brief for the Steel Company it is said (page
11):
'' The true interpretation of the terms 'monopolize' and 'restraint of trade' as used in these
sections ( of the Sherman Act) was in doubt for
a long time after the passage of the act. The
authors of the act, the members of the bar, and
the judges themselves, differed more or less
upon the subject for upwards of twenty years."
There is evidently, therefore, through the entire
brief no intimation even-that is, no open and candid intimation-that this court's construction of the
act is wrong, or leaves ''doubt'' as to how to apply
it.
It therefore becomes our privilege to attack the
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prior construction of this act, and to show by our
feeble demonstration that this construction amounts
simply to an attempt to make a constant out of a
variable.
Nor can we put the responsibility for this result
upon Congress.
;
Suppose Congress had specifically enacted that
'
where
two legally existing concerns or two individuals engaged in a specific trade should combine their
assets and plants, in order, if you please, to extinguish "competition" between them, the officers of
the companies or the individuals concerned should
be "guilty of a misdemeanor," and be punished by
:fine and imprisonment. What would this court have
said about such an act, except to hold it unconstitutional?
What would it have said of such an act, which was
furth er conditioned : That even though in such case
an intent to increase the volume of trade in that
article existed, and although there was concededly
an intent to reduce prices the parties were still
guilty?
How, then, can the court put such construction
upon a statute passed in general terms-"in general
language"? An act which does not expressly say
this, and yet a statute which can be safely interpreted in a way to r easonably :fix guilt, which can be
safely interpreted to mean unreasonable or fraudnlent trade practices, and unreasonable or frait ditlent
-that is, monopolistic--practices?
Is it not easily seen that this court has unconsciously dragged the statute from its base-'' re-
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straint of trade "-in order to indirectly "sustain"
what it is pleased to call our competitive system?
And what is our "competitive system"?
There is no definite concept in such a term except
independence or individuality in trade. And if the
statute prohibited mergers of independent plants, it
prohibited all, ALL such mergers.

If co-operation in trade is not an evil, per se, if
combination of small trade units is necessary
in some lin(}s of business in order to obtain the greatest amount of trade, and frequently absolutely necessa,r y to obtain any substantial part of foreign trade,
and instead· of depressing healthy competition, is
frequently an encouragement to (i) competition to
increase trade, (2) compet-ition to establish reasonable prices, and (3) com,petition to serve with best
efficiency the public in the line of the particular
trade-how do we :find any prolific benefit in a wholesale "preservation of our competitive, i. e., independent system?"
This court theref om has lamentably been betrayed
into attempts to make a constant out of a variable.
And most able attorneys are bringing records
to this court of such length that no human brain
could ever appreciate the showing of even a moderate fraction of the ''evidence'' given, and inviting
the court to wade through the 1,000 pages or more of
briefs submitted on each side, to find a count on
which to convict! The result is a wearisome shifting back and forth in the arguments before the court
-chasing a will o' the wisp.
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We do submit that it is indeed dangerous to find a
question of intent from all the various facts and suggestions submitted here-when no oppression of the
public has ever been claimed, either in the way of
enhancement of prices or in the way of reduction of
trade.
It is in fact an amazing thing.
"Two exporting grocers (Mr. Justices Holmes in
his Northern Securities dissent) are to be '' sent to
jail"-when it has been an obvious and utter impossibility, either on their part or on the part of any one
knowing all the facts, to tell when they became
guilty!

Conclusion.

All of the labors of the government's counsel
as shown by the headings in their brief, and all the
labors of the court in these several cases, and the
result of all of its reasoning, ~re shown to hover
around this one proposition:
That whereas, there were, (immediately prior to
the consolidation or to the adoption of the ''device''
of the (strictly legal) holding company), a number
of corporations which were independent of each
other, and presumably "competing" with each other,
for iron and steel trade, etc. ; and since they apparently had not-or at least no one of them hadpower "to control prices;" and whereas, immediately after the consummation of the device, the entire interests or trade represented by the holding
company and all its subsidiary companies, repre-
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sented an "estimated percentage" (whether 55 or 60
or 70%) of the total steel and iron trade of the country; there[ ore it must be presumed that there was an
intent from the new formed arrangement in the various companies or their officers'' to control prices,'' because such a large percentage of trade demonstrated
the power to so control. And hence, the result of
such arrangement was '' a stifling of competition between the former subsidiaries" and an attempt "to
monopolize the whole or a part of the steel and iron
trade or commerce,'' etc., etc.
But when, the defendants' counsel answers that
such an arrangement would result in vast economy
in handling the percentage of trade (whatever it actually was) ; when they further answer that it was
necessary to so integrate the various plants
and lines of trade, in order to bid for foreign trade; when they seek to prove it by the
vast actual increase in foreign trade from an insignificant to a very large proportion thereof; when
they point to the fact or claim that prices of the
same material, (quality and quantity considered).
were not greater after the consummation of the device than they were before, and in fact and upon the
average were definitely less; when they claim that
they have shown that the trade of the "non-trust"
or independent companies has increased in proportion more than the increase of the total trade of the
Steel Corporation; when they claim that the association has also greatly aided in increasing the total
volume of domestic trade, etc., etc., they are answered by this amazing proposition:

That all this is
guilty-of what?

IMMATERIAL,

a;nd that they are

44

Of an intent to unduly restrict not trade, but competition,-from which it follows that they are guilty
of acts in restraint of trade, etc., etc.!
This we repeat is an amazing situation. And why
there is no candid and open and vigorous attempt
made on behalf of the regular counsel for defendant
corporation to tear to sh eds this false concept is
equally amazing.
Is it feared that it would offend this court to suggest that occasionally it may make a mistake?
It is indeed a false respect for both the ability
and the candor of the justices of this court to assume that when the court has made a mistake, it will
not' confess its error, a thing which able justices
have to do almost daily on the trial bench and justices in reviewing courts frequently have to do-and
with no loss of respect from the bar or the public!
It is true that in the late argument in both the
Harvester and Steel cases very able arguments
were given to prove that an intent to restrain or monopolize or oppress could not validly
be inferred from this statute, unconnected with specific acts of wrong or oppression. But why was it
not openly said or suggested that the rulings to the
contrary in both the ''Securities'' and '' Standard
Oil'' decisions were erroneous?
When Mr. Justice Pitney asked Mr. Bancroft,
(for the Harvester Co.), as we recall his
words: '' I ~otice tha~ the court below based its opinion upon the fact that the Harvester Company controlled 80 or 85 per cent. of the total trade, and
that this gave you power to control prices in that line
of trade, and not upon the claim or basis that you
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actually had raised prices,'' etc., etc. '' I should like
you to direct your argument to this feature of the
case.''
Mr. Bancroft (unconsciously no doubt) declined
the gavge or challenge thus tendered him-and thereby missed his opportunity.
He answered with a very able argument to show
that wrong intent could not be gathered from an
act of combination or consolidation where the consolidated entity had existed for many years in actual practice, and when no enhancement of prices or
other specific trade acts of oppression, etc., etc., had
been perpetrated or claimed to ha.ve been perpetrated for at least 10 years last past-etc., and
then spoiled it all by his assertion that that was the
law "as he understood the decisions." (The "trust"
decisions of this court.)

It is time for some one to candidly suggest that
the court has e1·red in these ''trust'' decisions, and
thus render it the best service that can be given it
in these uniquely burdensome and brain-wearying
cases, and which are leading us-nowhere.
Respectfully submited,
HARRY

137 So. La Salle St.,
Chicago, March 20, 1917.
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To our Brethern,
the Justices of our National Supreme Court:
I attempt herein to voice a plea, which as one
in the throng I seem to hear from the younger generation of America as uttered from a vantage ground
of view or vision which, of necessity, it occupies
alone.
The fallibility of human judgment is not measured by the human mind or what it lacks. If so, a
body of jurists selected, as are the justices of this
court, from a large number of men trained in legal
logic, would rarely disagree upon clear-cut questions of legal principle, and an error of the majority in a thoroughly considered case of that kind
would be almost a marvel.
But early environment limits our view; custom
draws us into by-ways; dangers imagined in youth
bring ''fears in the way'' in old age; and ripened
judgment and honest patient effort have to yield a
tribute to these tyrants of experience and occasionally at their behest to step from the path of accuracy into the field of error . This is true of us all.
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The older generation have fought and conquered
the hard pressing issues of their younger day. The
younger have thus been left freei in their early
youth to diagnose issues in embryo, and by the
time these have grown large and have to be met
are more familiar with them, have taken their measure, are more ready with weapons for the fray,
have selected the vulnera"ble places for attack, are
more confident of victory.
In the logical trend of things the younger generation have been carried farther on in the road to
progress, farther up the mountain towards the pinnacle of universal peace.
Here is their vantage ground.

The call to service does not necessarily summon us

to tread beaten paths or to observe set forms, or to
repeat time-worn amenities.
The '' officer of the court'' sworn to aid it-to
const(J/Yl,tly aid it-in the ascertainment of truth,in the upholding of truth,- is not bound to conceal
his knowledge of a vital error having been committed until the curriculum of a widely variant practice shall bring around a similar case or bury it forever. Nor is a paid retainer the only key to unlock
the breast of a / aithful officer and loose the secret
there concealed and prompt an appeal for justice and
right.
The justices of the court sworn to support the
constitution and uphold the law are not bound to
hide any conviction of error committed and allo":
legal rights to be abridged or destroyed, and con-
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fusion to increase until perchance some one affected
by the error shall divine that the judges have perceived their error AND will be willing to acknowledge
it.
It makes no difference that custom has sanctioned
this cou·rse. The development of character and the
enlargement of soul may involve the departure from
ruts of error as well as an adherence to the lines
of truth; and each refusal to so depart where the
duty seems clear, adds a new sin to one's record.
The secret of error committed in innocence becomes
burdened with the guilt of concealment.

So, feeling that the high court of the land has
erred in a case offar-reaching importance which will
add to the already fast gathering confusion, tend
to put off the day of ultimate reckoning and to further obscure the light in a day of much darkness,
the writer submits this appeal to the justices to reconsider the issue of competition or co-operation,
and to the majority ( or to any one of them) to_confess to themselves and of record their error if they
have erred and can discern it; or that they announce
that the principles involved in the "Merger" decision will be re-considered upon a proper case presented.
My call to respond: It is in the line of my profession.
My warrant: Born in America.

In the name of the common people who demand
that the most vital principles of the day be not an-

nounced in the highest court of the land with a divided judicial mind and heart;
In the name of the patriots of America who are
pained to see the press explaining divisions among
the justices as caused by partisan bias and belief
in the truth of which is of necessity fostered· by such
repeated divisions;
In the name of those ambitious to serve by formulating wholesome and efficient measures for relief and who can have full confidence in legal principles upon which to build, only when announced by
a united court, and whose work requires that obstructions be cleared from the way;
In the name of the labor unions and other co-opera tive bodies of America who rightfully wonder
whether ''competition'' demands an undivided fealty
in economics, and rules our industrial destiny-is
omni-beneficial; or whether "co-operation" ha,s any
warrant for recognition, and whether the bond which
bind_s them together for co-operative effort is tainted
and ignoble;The younger generation appeals for a re-consideration of the principles involved in the Northern
Securities case.
To the end that a united court or a more united
court may utter the verdict ''void'' or ''valid,'' and
the way be cleared for action and advance.

The nation ought to anticipate impending evils
by preventative measures. And where evils have
grown up for the want of such measures they ought
to be promptly corrected.
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Usually the people neither prevent nor promptly
correct; they have to be driven to face about after
they have suffered from disaster.
Such disaster may sometimes be def erred by an
erroneous judicial fiat, which temporarily relieves
the pressure or relieves it in certain places; but it
is bound to be all the more momentous and dread
when it does come.
Great crises in a nation's internal affairs never
come unannounced. There is always a herald whose
warning is not heeded ; there are ominous rumblings
which are laughted at or willingly diagnosed as accidental or incidental or ultra-distant.
The Demon of Evil does not openly and boldly
destroy. He first confuses, and while his prospective victims are looking in various directions or
accusing each other, and their systems are temporarily deranged and disordered, he innoculates his
insidious poison.
America has become intensely commercialized.
The god of Mammon reigns. He demands heavy
tribute from all individuals and institutions. Courts
formerly useful in building up deliberately a science
of legal rights are now strained to repeat, at the
instance of oppressors and speculators, their timeworn decrees and announcements, leaving but little
time for the consideration of vital and "pioneer"
cases. They are thus of necessity rushed into error
a large part of th.e tim,e and thus is fostered division
and the now common and essentially ominous dissent.
The frequent errors of high sta.te courts have now
become alarming; and many divisions and dissents
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in the court of ultimate national judicial authority
proves-must of necessity prove-frequent error.
Much is thus added to the fast gathering confusion;
and this occurring so often in the most vital cases
gives alone a heavy impetus towards the danger
brink; or makes a heavy draft upon the nation's
economies, and hence upon its welfare and its life.
Epoch-making issues must be settled correctly or
grave consequences follow. Epoch-making decisions
must not be allowed to remain as first declared by
a divided court, or calmly submitted to by the whole
people of the country with a "so goes the world"
sigh of resignation.
The consequences are too serious.
It is not the money interests of Mr. Hill and his
associates that have been involved here.
It is not railroad rates or the quality of service
to the communities served by the two or three roads
in question.

The question is, rather, shall a nation grown old
and highly developed industrially, its territory covered with a close network of railroads and other
trade arteries, be allowed to combine its establishments and roads in the interest of economy to the
whole people; or shall this be prevented upon the
plea that mankind is naturaly sel:fish, cannot be
trusted, and that therefore it is dangerous to be
economical?
It is whether "making money" is to be forever
assumed to be the chief ambition of man and the goal
. of his "prosperity" and be he forever encouraged
to treat it as such, and that therefore co-operative
agencies or instruments are not to be encouraged

•
7
for fear of greed controlling the exercise of the
increased powers.

It is whether in the onward march of the nation at
large towards its goal of sacrifice and ministry, it
may try to husband its energies, save repetition in its
local systems, and so co-operate in its public and
semi-public industries and utilities as to spare the
greatest number of people for alleviating and ministering to needy ones at home and abroad.
To correctly settle such question, it will do but
little good to look over decided cases. We must look
to the future and have visions and some conceptions
of the destiny of the country at large.
What is this destiny?
Continued and increasing sway of the god of Mammon, commercialism forever, the masses financially
subjugated, the ceaseless struggle for positions of
vantage and power over each other,-constant restlessness,-hopelessness,-death?
Or, equity in dealing, justice, forbearance, sacrifice, hopefulness, vision, service to other nations,
world redemption?
If the latter, is not" co-operation" the watchword
for advanee, the aecompaniment of collective effort
for others f And if so, what is the import of a . decree which stifles this battle-cry?

Whenever courts have gone wrong in cases involving grave questions of public policy or economy, fear
of some imagined pending evil or disaster has been
usually the lodestone of error.
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'' As man thinketh in his heart, so is he,'' applies
not merely to questions of morality.
"As Justice fears in her heart, so is she," could
accurately be written of decrees human.
What is it that Justice has feared in this caseT
The possibility that one corporation or set of men
might control the whole iransportation system of the
coimtry.
But, suppose such a thing were economical to the
general public of the country.
Suppose it were more convenient for the general
public of the country.
Supposing the aggregate wealth, the aggregate
trade, if you please, of the whole country were thereby increased?
What then?
To say that the nation at large would be incapable
of regulating such a company is to confess national
weakness, and to run away from an ·issue that possibly must be met.
We are passing-have passed-the bend in the
river. We must not refuse to turn about and look
ahead. Driven by Necessity toward the headland of
Satisfaction, we have refused to turn up the broad
highway of Sacrifice and Ministry. And Prejudice
and Habit have made us willingly blind to the rocks
of Commercialism and Greed directly ahead. Now
we doubt each other, are blaming each other, are
quarreling with each other; we refuse to turn about;
and the hell-whisper of "Paternalisrn and Socialism" is more audible to us than the stentorian appeal "Courage and Co-opera,tion," the battle-cry of
our professed faiths.
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Brethern of the Bench: Let us whisper a word of
courage : America is strong enough, she has courage
enough to meet the issue brought upon herselfCo-operation or Stagnation, God or Mammon, Life
or Death!
Do her not the wrong of keeping her eyes blinded
to the issue which has long pressed upon her and
is pressing harder the while, and to her full, duty
of marshalling for co-operative effort and master
strokes her minions in error and unhappiness, as
well as those whose ideals are healthful and true,
but whose energies are unused and dormant.

Justice, too, not only fears, but she also has fads
and bugaboos. She sins not from plain dishonesty.
She yearns to do right. But she is "renewed like
the eagle'' from generation to generation in her
foibles and prejudices, as well as in her strength.
These uncrown her at times without her knowing it
and work ruin in her courts.
We can bring to the justices of this court no rules
of logic unknown to them.
We can add nothing to their powers of reasoning.
We can analyze cases no better than has been done,
and fuller analysis would d no good.
But may we not appeal for more confidence in
America's coming yeomanry and add testimony that
it can and means to fight its battles with weapons
fit, and to meet issues-to conquer 7
May we of the younger ge~eration not appeal for
the privilege of bearing the burden which is ours,

10

to be allowed to feel the full pressure of issues which
confront us?
May we not protest against the fear of combination, and question the warrant which forbids us cooperation?
May we not volunteer in the present and add our
vision of the future?
May it not be that we have all been looking too
closely to the mountain of precedent piling up, and
thus have been tied to the past, and forgotten to
look to the future for our hope and to find the path
we must tread?
The milestone cases of this court of the earlier
day were not nominated by precedent .and the phrasings of constitutions were not interpreted by wading through its mazes. The destiny of the country
was looked to and this as dictated, by the vision of
a faithful strenuous lived race.
Has this case been argued with this destiny kept
constantly in view? If so, we cannot discern it in the
briefs.
Analysis and logic might be sufficient for such
cases if they were reasoned on principle alone; but
if it is tried to drag them through many and complex reported cases the course is long and devious;
and it is too much to expect that nine men can correctly travel the whole sinuous course from end to
end and come out at the same exit unless the way·
is lighted from above.
May we not be passing the bend of the river, where
wasteful competition must be left behind and effective co-operation must be the watchword Y
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With all due deference, it is no "mere economic
question which this court need not consider or determine.''
The question here is whether a thing is an evila public evil. And as this thing is one of trade, it
is a trade question, an economic question. If the
thing is such evil, it falls witp.in the prohibition
of the Congress of the country. If it is not, it cannot fall within it.
No one contends or claims that in express terms
any certain style of corporations or any certain
method of incorporating was interdicted. It is not
a question, therefore, as to whether a particular
method or techniqite, as it were, is illegal.
The question is whether a certain principle of action shall be condemned, which principle may be
necessary for the progress of the nation or for the
achievement of its destiny, or to save its very life?
This principle is co-operation.
Have the arguments dwelt prominently with this
principle, or carried it out to its ultimate scope, or
shown clearly how the decree of the court of necessity condemns itT
If not (and it is thought that they have not) there
is yet a niche to :fill.

We said above the '' omin us dissent.'' But it is
ominous not only to the public; it is so to the court
itself.
In the Trans-Missouri case as well as in the present case, Mr. Justice White protested that the court's
decision condemned in principle every labor union,
the members of which had associated themselves to-
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gether to better their condition and obtain reasonable wages.
If this should be so, is not the error of the decision capable of being made so clear that every sane,
hard-headed mechanic or laboring man throughout
the country will not only believe it, but be able to
see why it is so.

Says Mr. Justice Holmes : '' The question here is
whether two exporting grocers should go to jail;''
and that the decision holds illegal every ordinary
partnership or association, etc., throughout the country, which has been made by competing tradesmen.
If this be true, will not the small partner or stockholder, as well as the large and prominent one, be
able to see it T

The common yeoman can usually tell, on the facts
being given, whether the two exporting grocers
should go to jail. The laborer and mechanic live in
the principles which dictate and support an effort
to secure betterment of their condition; and if the
Supreme Court of the land has run counter to such
principles in its deliberate and studied judgment or
decree, they will sooner or later discern it. If such
a decision does affect and condemn such organizations and their earnest efforts to bring about better
wages and better conditions, in the very nature of
things it will not be long until this court will either
have to renounce its doctrine and vote its decisions
erroneous or will be invited to enter judgment
against inter-state labor unions and similar bodies,
a thing which it will find itself very reluctant to do.
Are not the warnings of Justices White and
Holmes in these two cases, potent with the sugges-
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tion that another effort ought to have been made and
still ought to be made, to have the justices agree 1
Is it not just possible that error has been made and
in a matter both vital and simple of understanding?
Do not the dissent of four judges make it probable?
The frequent dissent of so many judges must of
necessity weaken, has of necessity heavily weakened,
the confidence of the people at large in this court,waving entirely aside the professional agitator, and
the yellow journal editor, and counting only the great
body of respectful, law-abiding, unprejudiced, hardheaded and just citizens.
A court of rugged :fidelity and highest intelligence,
its dissentient decrees have been the rule for years
in matters of most vital import. This is enough in
and of itself to alarm reflecting lawyers and citizens.
To assume that the majority of one has been constantly right, is to assign to that one mammoth mental parts and unnatural superiority to his colleagues.
This might explain the situation if the dissenters
were the same judges all the time, or the dominating
vote came uniformly from the same judge.
No, we cannot explain the dissents or divisions
that way. The ability and industry of the judges
are not questioned by anybody. We doubt if Marshall and his worthy colleagues would have been
more uniform in their opinions had they been doing
or attempting to do the work that this court is
trying to do to-day.

But that brings us to another vital point or suggestion which no doubt ere this has been raised in
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the mind of the reader: How can this court transa.ct the business thrown upon it with promptness
and dispatch, and yet have time for the reconsideration or rehearing of cases, or for ultra-earnest and
exhaustive efforts on the part of its justices to agree?
It cannot.
But it can give such deliberation to cases it does
decide. It can be particularly careful with its "pioneer" or turning-point cases, leaving to the Congress and other agencies the reframing or remodeling of the system of practice so as to relieve its
congested docket.
That this is necessary there is no doubt. And the
writer will not dodge the challenge implied in the
suggestion, viz., what plan therefor is feasible 7 We
will not prolong this document with a long argument,
but just outline some suggestions "in the rough."
(NoTE: Here are omitted some six or eight pages
devoted to suggestions as to how the congested
docket of the court could be relieved.)
The chain of reasoning running through the majority opinion is as follows:
Congress has power to regulate inter-state trade;
these two "merged" carriers are engaged in such
trade; they are thus subject to regulation by Congress;
The object of the anti-trust act was, and its language imports as much, to protect the public from
combinations, co·n spiracies, etc., which restrain such
trade ; a merger of two ''competing'' or independent
lines or establishments engaged in such trade extinguished competition between them;
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The extinguishment of cornpetition between two
sitch lines or establishments in and of itself restrains
trade; hence the merger of these independent or competing lines is ivithin the prohibition of the act.
There are two unsound links in the chain-the ones
italicized.
What is this "competition," which term the court
• has read into this actT
''Competition,' '-a seekino- too-ether.
Seeking what T
Seeking trade T
Or to make money through trade T
Or to make the most money with the least trade?
Or to a-et the most trade without losing any money
while making little or no profit T
Or to give the best possible service for the most
money?
Or to give the poorest service consistent with making much money-or little money-or merely a fair
living-or simply keeping above the point of actual
loss T
Or to give good service to the public, even at the
point of much actual loss-or little actual loss-or
no loss-or little profit-or fair profit-or gross
profit?
Do all independent concerns, "competing" concerns, agree in their policies and tally in the degree
of intensity in their purposes T
If they do, what is this policy, and at what point
is this intensity!
If they do not, of what definite value, or how
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definite is this "competition" that has been made to
do this yeoman duty in interpreting the act of .Congressf
What is competition,-this alleged priceless boon
in the trade world,-this supposed self-acting regulator or governor of the laws of trade in the interest
of the public T
Competition has been confused with the inducement to compete.
If I hold a piece of meat before two hungry dogs,
a struggle for the meat might and usually would result; yet the meat-the inducement for the struggle
-must no.t be confused with the struggle itself.
It is not absolutely certain that such a struggle for
the meat will result-one dog may fear the other
and not try for it, ot he may imagine that meat will
not agree with him, or he may have compassion on
his hungry companion, etc.
If there is enough meat for both dogs, there is not
apt to be a very great struggle on the part of either.

But, however this may be, the point of the illustration is, that the inducement to compete is not competition, even in dog nature-and that even '.' dog
competition'' does not follow automatically from the
inducement.
A live beef in a corral close to an armed starving
Englishman would logically have but one fate in
999 instances out of a 1,000; before a starving Hindoo, it would likewise have but one fate-but a
wholly different one-it would be perfectly safe from
molestation. Yet in the former instance the placing
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of the beef before the Englishman could not be said
to have directly caused its death.
The merger, therefore, of two independent and
competing establishments does not in and of itself
extinguish the effort of each to serve the public to
the best of their ability.
The public has no direct interest in the struggle or
rivalry between two independent establishmentsit has what it is pleased to call an interest in the
"benefits" of competition. It has a right to prompt
service and reasonable prices,. Has it a right to
rwinous prices-prices established by one man, which
will ruin himself and all his competitors f
And if the public gets its service and its reasonable prices, what interest has it beyond this?
The second fallacy in the opinion is in the basal
assumption so often reiterated, that the extingu.ishment of competition is a restraint of trade.
Here is the great lodestone of error, the blind
alley-the air-hole-the maze.
T'o extinguish actual competition between what
may be naturally competing establishments, without
substituting anything else, may lead to public detriment.
'
To co-operate and joi.n means and resources for
the purpose of increasing trade and developing new
territory, is a different thing.

It makes no difference that the ultimate object in
such co-opera.taion is the making of money. For it
will certainly be conceded that the main incentive to
business enterprise is making money; and the induce-

18
ment for more enterprise would seem logically and
legitimately to be the making of more money.
What has led this court to assume that only evil
comes from a combination which happens to extinguish the inducement to compete, or that it can
bring no advantages of economy, or public convenience, etc., which must be set off against such competition and a balance struck before the net evil or
net good be ascertained?
The court reasons: That Congress in express terms
has not for bidden mergers or consolidations, but
only such as restrain trade; as mergers or consolidations of independent or competing establishments
do restrain trade, the ref ore the same are within the
inhibition of the act.
Then the court proceeds to say that it has no concern with the question of whether such mergers, etc.
may be a public benefit, i. e., do not restrain trade,
for Congress has by its :fiat said that all combinations which· restrain trade, are illegal.
A more complete begging of the question, it is hard
to conceive.
And the court proceeds to say: That if this merger
is allowed, then further mergers could be allowed,
until still much more gigantic mergers would be able
to fix prices over .a large territory and possibly ·t he
whole country. And when it is answered that Oongress could regulate such rates, and therefore that
the fear thus used by the court is unfounded, the
court replies that, if Congress could do so, it has
not chosen to do so, but has simply decreed that
such mergers are illegal-around the circle again.

19
Will the justices deny that the approbation of a
manager may be and often is sufficient to bring out
the best service in a foreman or other employe Y
That healthy rivalry between each other for good
marks by the manager is inducement enough for the
best service of such foremen or workmen Y
That genuine public service and public approbation and uniform testimony to a business life well
spent, may be inducement enough for men to do their
business well, to be fair in :fixing rates, and to prompt
them to ''mergers,'' if you please, solely in the interest of economy, greater development and better
service?
Why may not two competing establishments or
lines of railroad be run to their fullest capacity under one management and give out their best service
to the public? Have they no inducement to do so Y
May not duty to one's self and one's community be
such an inducement?
Is it not easy to believe that people can or can
learn to love their community enough to use energy
and ·means in its service?
Brethern of the Rob e: The younger generat~on of
America does not intend to grovel in ruts of selfishness, or even in ruts of service. It is not going to
suck the life-blood of a cofillil.unity through corporate oppression, or seek to appropriate the labor of
large numbers of comrades in service at starvation
wages, and then stand around waiting for war to
show its "patriotism." And it is not going to allow others to do so.
It resents any volunteered estimate of America's
manhood which pictures it as grasping and bound to
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grasp all it can to the point of straining the cotmtry 's institutions and '' rendering Congress helpless" against its exactions.
And by the way, it wonders why, if '' inter-state
trade is a unit'' over which the power of Congress
is" absolute and supreme," there is any doubt about
the power of Congress o regulate the rates of such
traffic, and to see to it that they are not exorbitant
and oppressive.
It wonders why the court should even take pains
"to express no opinion" on this subject, when the
court itself finds its chief inspiration in the f ear of
public oppression by heavy rate exactions.
May not love of country, love of service, love of
God, be as natural an inditcement, as great a magnet,
pendent lines, as the approbation of a human supeplaced over one railroad management of two inderior is over a foreman or workman of one line T
Are we not to believe that human nature is growing better, that it may, if its responsibilities are
placed upon it, grow better? And does it not need
its struggles and its risks to grow stronger and
more rugged T
And are there no exceptions to the rule-even 'if
such rule be dictated by experience-that men will
get all they can take and will oppress if they have
the opportunity, and that conipetition is the only
spur to wholesome effort and the only check 011 oppression T
Have we forgotten the American patriots of the
Revolutionary period who placed their fortunes at
the service of their country ip. time of need T
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Have we forgotten the honest shoemakers of our
home villages, who insisted on making good boots
and for an honest wage T
Was the man, who during a fuel famine refused
to sell his cordwood to the speculators, but sold all
to consumers at ante-famine prices, a freak? ·
Is the '' Village Blacksmith'' a myth?
How has America fallen from her high estate when
the highest court in the land rules in effect that its
countless minions are debased by greed, will continue
so, and that its mighty Congress is "powerless in
the premises. That the patriots who will give their
lives for it in war will not give their means to it in
peace, or will not refrain from injuring it, and can
never be taught or trained up to so act, that its
ideals are myths, its religion of service a sham!

We spoke of crises :
Instantly the mind reverts to war or riots, or sudden and widespread disaster, and speculates upon
the question how near do either of these impend 1

If we seem to be in no immediate danger, all temporary fear is dispelled and the writer is put down.
as an alarmist.
Crises, however, are not alone those occasions
where the public peace is threatened.
Whether a crisis attends the taking of any particular step is not measured by the ma.rgin between
such step and open riot or manifest calamity.
As a matter of fact, no government is safe when
the lives of its people are essentiaUy wrong.
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When, however, the problem of governmental safety may be supposed to be pretty well solved, crises
will be the turning points in the lives and economies
of the people.
If this decision were to the effect that all labor
unions in America were illegal combinations, and
that this court would enjoin all or any such unions
as were interstate or affected interstate trade, it
would startle every American citizen and the occasion would be recognized as a crisis.
Yet, four of the nine justices think and say that the
decision does condemn the basal principle of such
unions.
Why is this fact alone not enough both to suggest
and command a rehearing or a reconsideration of
the principles involved T
If t1:1-e nation at large has reached the parting of
the ways ; and the people recognize that they must
now take the highway of co-operation to reach their
future goal; if this is so manifest, if the basic economic laws and impulses a.re so :firm and so strong as
to start and keep them on this road or highway, in
spite of an occasional court decree producing confusion here and there, it will be said a decree as this is
not so critical after all-no particular disaster will
result.
But is it not-must it not be a crisis in the history
of this court, and a heavy blur upon its record?
Shall the courts be left behind beckoning to the
forsaken way and forging fragmentary chains of
error on the soundless anvil of precedent and fear?
In the beginning of the argument which accom-
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panies this plea (Part II), there is set out in over
fifty numbered paragraphs, a number of observations of the writer which were printed and issued
some weeks before the merger decision was rendered
in this court. The pamphlet was written before any
study of the cases. It was meant to show the economi~ truths which seemed to the writer to appear
from one's actual experiences before the maze of
decisions were entered.
Its main plea is a dual one: co-operation and regulation.
The history of events since the pamphlet was written has only confirmed this plea. The present effort
of Congress made within a few months is to pass
regulatory laws and increase the power of the Interstate Commission.
The people are taking, have taken the right road.
It is little credit to them. They should have taken
it years ago; and have been driven into the road by
sheer force of an economic law and for self-protection.
Yet the point is, the people are marching on and
now invite the court to follow. Will it not feel impelled to do so 7
The court feared a combination which would control '' the whole transportation system of the country.'' But Mr. Prouty ( of the Interstate Commerce
Commission), points out in his article of last June,
in ''North American Review,'' that for quite a while
a big majority of the railroad mileage of the United
States is controlled by a half-dozen individuals-the
event which the court feared has practically existed
for quite a while.
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You see, court decisions and the cry "Down with
the trusts,'' have not destroyed, the trusts or prevented their growth.
In the sajd accompanying suggestions we seek to
prove this outline :
(a) Untrammeled competition, recognized as
healthful in building up the early industries of the
country, is now in certain lines of industry, unhealthful, and its continued practice occasions waste.
(b) The ''trust,'' is an economic growth and an
economic necessity.
(c) It brings increased power to individuals by
reason of its combination features.
( d) Therefore, it demands special regulation;
and special security against acts of oppression may
be required of it.
( e) The cost of this regulation is the price of the
saving by means of the trust.
It was also said :

'' The form of trust mentioned in the Sherman Act
is a trust to restrain trade.
'' The ever odious 'trust' of the popular conception
as well as of the demago!Z'lle on the stump is the trust
of oppression. It was more prevalent a decade ago
than now. The trust of healthy economy of fair
wages and legitimate returns has been more in evidence lately. The trust of the future will be this latter trust with returns of promoters or managers held
for public uses or used for the common good. The
'trust' may act for good or for evil. Whatever its
action may be, however, its warrant for EXISTENCE is
co-OPERATION. .And to condemn co-operation is to
condemn life itself."
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The fear of this court is not primarily of the trust;
The fear of the people is not primarily of the trust;
The fear is that the American people are so supine,
so confused, so tied up by selfishness and so dormant
in their ideals of civic duty and civic patriotism,
so bound to a rank and silly partisanship, etc., etc.,
that they will not rouse themselves to use their inherent sup ei·visory power to control these creatures
that economic progress has brought to them.
Were this issue the ultimate test of American citizenship this court could not save the people from
the issue.
The syllogism of the majority opinion restated is:
(1) To destroy competition is baneful to the pub-

lic and therefore illegal.
(2) To own to the point of controlling both these
roads gives the power to destroy competition between
them.
(3) Where this power to destroy competition is
thus acquired this in and of itself operates to destroy
it.
That ·is, the coming of the power into existence,
its very a.dvent, destroys competition-that is, the
power to destroy competition and competition itself
cannot exist at the same moment; that is, the inducem ent to use the power to destroy is destruction itself
-the inducement works automatically, as it wereis an actor-is alive a11d working-human nature in
the main is bent one way-is debased-cannot restrain the automatic working of the inducement!
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Is not the complete non-sequitur in the third proposition glaringly apparent?
It is confusing competition with the inducement to
compete.
It is about as logical as to say that a man by taking
a position where he can throw stones at either of
two houses, hits one of them; or that by the mere fact
that one has come to a crossroads he must be held
to intend to take the wrong road instead of the
right one.

The responsibility for erroneous decisions in the
Trans-Missouri case and in this case (if they be
both found erroneous) does not rest alone with this
court.
The fear of the trust combination or merger, openly expressed by this court in argument and opinions,
was prompted by love of country and was uttered in
the people's interest. The court was entitled to be
met on this ground.
But it was not. An adequate consideration of the
people's interest in the broad question and their
protection from the increased economic power inherent in the trust, clearly involved this issue. Yet,
outside of a few occasional skeleton suggestions, the
court received but scanty argument along this line.
The word "co-operation" was little used-the
word ''regulation'' still less. There was no appeal
on the part of the railroads to be regulated.
There was no one appealing to this court to warn
the people by its decree that the time has arrived
"and even now is" for them to 1,se their power of
regulation.
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Some would say: "This is true for a very evident reason. The railroads did not want to be regulated. Their lawyers were controlled in their interests. They did not dare give out their fullest
light.''
This may be the true explanation. But we pref er
to think that the lack of argument in the line of regulation was rather due to non-appreciation of this
feature of the subject and to the idea prevalent
throughout the country that anything which might
tend to restrict the piling up of immense fortunes
in the hands of railroad magnates or other captains
of industry was ''paternalistic'' and a hamper upon
'' enterprise. ''
Nevertheless, whatever the reason, we make bold
to say that these cases were not fully argued certainly from the standpoint of the public interest.
For instance, in the brief of Mr. Bunn, in the present case, where the decision of the Circuit judges is
entirely cut to pieces by inexorable logic, as it is
thought, the word ''co-operation'' is scarcely used at
all, and no suggestion of regulation is made therein.
While one is apt to be misunderstood, the effort to have this court set itself right'' and that right
early'' in this matter of vital public concern, even
though made by an humble pen, surely cannot be
inconsistent with a keen sense of justice,. and a regret to see wrong unrighted.
In this day of gathering confusion the nation appeals above all for accuracy in all her affairs, and
especially in the decrees of her courts. _She recognizes that her people sin against her. She also
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recognizes that they will correct these when they see
them.
She recognizes that without new issues to meet
she will stand still and then decay; and she asks that
no incorrect, though well-meant, decree shall shield
her from the :fight.
Error in vital cases in er courts results in injury,
and its consequences directly and indirectly but
surely gravitate down to and reach the lives of her
subjects; their labor is thus wasted, their efforts
rendered futile, their welfare affected, they lose-they suffer.

If our country has destiny and a soul, it appeals,
silently it is true, but appeals all the same for a
chance to develop her soul and approach that destiny.
And it surely cannot be wrong for one, who seems
to see obstructions placed in her path, to do his share
towards removing them.
Error is not only wrong-it wownds.
Error has wounded America I
To trace the cause of this error and display it
clearly to the justices of this court is the work of an
able champion. But no able champion is attempting it.
And it would seem not to be wrong for the humblest
who seems to see the wound in her side to beckon to
it; feeling that pain must be there to invite to assuage it; seeing the lips mechanically obedient to
precedent and habit, to attempt to release them, and
to render articulate her Silent Appeal.

29

PART II.
Comparative Schedule.
1. As population grows more dense the industrial

system of the country
(a) Becomes more complex;
(b) Demands greater centralization in its management;
( c) Casts greater responsibility upon its managers;
(d) Gives greater opportunity for oppression;

hut
( e) Brings the greater necessity for effective
police regulations,
(f) The greater the penalties that should accompany abuse of responsibility, both by prescribed punishment and public opprobrium.
(g) And the more security should accompany
the centralization of power to protect against
oppression.
2. The more generally an industry touches or affects the people at large,
(a) The more public it is, and hence
(b) The stronger it bids for public-i. e., governmental-regulation.
(c) The greater the penalties and loss arising
from the lack of regulation, and hence
( d) The greater the cost of any prejudices
which may keep us from taking such a logical
step or adopting a plan of regulation.

3. The older an industry becomes
(a) The more highly developed it is apt to become.
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(b) The greater the necessity of centralization
from the standpoint of both economy and convenience.
(c) And hence the more public it is apt to become and the more it is apt to need public
recognition.
(d) The less the benefit to the public at large
from actual competition, and
( e) The greater waste in competition,
(f) The grea.ter does co-operation figure in its
economy and effectiveness.
~

4. The greater and more intense the commerce of
the nation becomes,
(a) The more stringent the police measures required for its regulation,
(b) The more does national regulation and
supervision become necessary,
( c) And the greater the confusion from variance in local and state regulations and the
greater the aggregate waste and public loss
therefrom.
5. The greater the capital required for the establishment of an industry affecting the public at large
(like, for instance, a railroad),
(a) The greater the waste from actual competition occasioning the building of entire new
lines where they are unnecessary for the public service.
(b) While the necessity of public regulation of
the established lines is all the greater.
6. The greater the number of railroads in the
country,
(a) The greater necessity for centralized management and
(b) Assured permanent policies, and thus
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(c) Combinations among owners,
(d) The greater the aggregate waste and confusion and inconvenience from the want of
such combinations.
7. The larger and more extensive the railroads of
the country,
(a) The more stringent should be their supervision.
(b) The less effective is local supervision and
more urgent the call for national supervision.
Now, it would not seem hard for a candid observer
to recognize :
1. That the industrial system of the country is
complex;
2. That the railroad industry affects the people
at large;
3. That it is now an old industry;
4. That the commerce of the country has greatly intensified;
5. That great capital is required by the establishment of railroads ;
6. That there are a great number of railroads
in the country; and
7. That they are large and extensive.
And hence the necessity for recognition of the cooperative principle and the fatuity of holding to
competition as a remedy. And hence the necessity
for regulatory police and supervisory methods of
such indu~tries. And hence, if evils and oppression
hav e occurred (who will say they have not?), can we
not attribute them to the absence of effective regulation?
When, however, we speak of the intensifying of
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industries, commercial relationships, the growing
complexity of modern life and increase of the volume
of business, already vast, the mind instantly conceives of vast regulating .a gencies and of excessive
interference and ''paternalism.''
And if this commercialism and complexity continues to increase, this fea.r would be well founded.
But how about the commercialism, etc., ivithoid the
regulation? Is it not to be feared more?
'' The plainest things are things we do not see.''
Probably the hardest lesson for the American people to learn is to learn that commercialism ITSELF
oppresses.
The regulation which is demanded by an intensely commercialized and individually intensified life
is simply a war measure-a measure of defensesomething to hold things together while the people
face about and enter into simpler living and find their
lives in fields of service. And when they do this
there will be comparatively few industries to be regulated to any great extent-those only that affect the
people at large, like railroads, telegraphs, telephones,
navigation, etc. The ref ore, to the above comparative statements, we add a few more, viz. :
8. The simpler the article manufactured, however,
(a) The less special is the skill required in its
manufacture, and
(b) The less the necessity for centralization in
its manufacture.
9. The simpler the habits and methods of living
in a people,
(a) The fewer their wants.
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(b) The smaller their manufacturing interests.
( o) The simpler their industrial system.
(d) The less strain upon public regulation and
regulating bodies,
( e) The more effective will be the regulation
of such industries as are necessary to be regulated, more time being left therefor.
(f) The more time will the people have for the
urgent militant work and offices of the individual and the nation for others.
10. The greater the internal evils of the nation,
(a) The greater the necessity for co-operation
in combating them.
(b) The greater the necessity for recognizing
the co-operative principle, and, of course,
( o) The more serious the blow to public weal
by denying such principle.
11. The more the nation and its people become
militant for the good and amelioration of other nations and peoples,
(a) .The more will the co-operative principle be
used
First-To prevent waste in the repetition of
one man's work by another; and
Second-To give more effective work through
unity of action.

A Vision.

A land highly cultivated and productive, a land of
homes with gardens and fields, a land of strong men
and faithful women, living simple and rugged lives,
toiling daily, striving constantly, resting regularly,
grand in character, large-souled, throbbing in spirit,
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acting upon its faith, co-operating for good, ''working together with God."
Its erstwhile great cities decentralized, its countless thousands rescued from slums of filth and pauperism, as well as slums of selfishness and gluttony,
and restored to normal conditions, its complex '' conveniences" abolished, its child-life simple, healthful,
buoyant and full of hope.
Its nation"'wide highways centralized and controlled in the interest of economy and convenience,
its local highways and utilities managed in the interest of and for its communal welfare, extravagance
banished, efficiency predominant, while home functions are preserved in wholesome priva~y and exercised under tender family care.
It does not rest upon itself redeemed; it hears
the Macedonian cry from across the water. Its hearalds have long been there preparing the way. Its
minions are going and coming to and from its labor
field, bringing the subjects of its care and love to its
own homes and settlements or sharing their life
abroad.
And this land is America-its f everisb rush for
gold stilled in the calm of home culture; its struggle between brother and brother at an end; competition for positions of vantage over each other banished; competition to serve each other intensified.
America in the peace of a normal life-and its flag
a symbol of co-operation .

.
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A Retrospect.

Those were the days (when the Northern Securities case was pending) of commercialism run mad.
The struggle for existence on the part of the early
settlers had been conquered and succeeded by the industrial development of the county under the banner of ''enterprise,'' ~nd this banner was still held
aloft and before the eyes of all-the millionairethe multimillionaire, as well as the hard pressed
laborer.
'"Success'' was the watchword and was understood to be getting rich, serving well in war, attracting attention through talents or holding office.
Patriotism was but faintly understood. '' To fight
and, if need be, die for one's country" in time of
war, was its interpretation. To live for one's community in time of peace was to most people a new
and even curious idea.
The motives of men in business were supposed to
be entirely commercialized-to get money at all hazards, stopping only at the point of effectual legal restraint.

*
Those were, indeed, the days of commercialism run
mad; of ideals at war with pr ctices:
Immense fortunes had been accumulated in private
hands, and for purely private uses!
Children, not only occasionally but as a rule inherited these large fortunes, and of course were ruined
by them or their development retarded and their
lives _d warf eq..
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Men seemed thoroughly dead to any sense of this
folly, in spite of the uniform object lessons of
wrecked lives in wealthy people's children.
It was no disgrace to work simply to accumulate
money; and a bequest of one's fortune ( above a
legitimate family competence) to the state, would
have occasioned public comment as a very liberal
thing!
The policy of nations was to build up only their
own trade, and trade with foreign nations was nurtured only to the point that it was beneficial to domestic wealth getting; while in churches everywhere
was preached the doctrine of sacrifice and was held
aloft the vision of world unification 1
This, too, at a time when a nation sometimes lent
its life blood to give another state independence !
Competition, recognized as healthful in the building up of the early industries of the country, had
long outlived its general usefulness; and, enshrined
as a sort of trade idol, was used blindly to retard cooperation of large interests so necessary to fullest
development.
Thus direct waste was committed in the name of
the public good; so great was the dread of the "power of wealth. ''
This fear was the controlling influence which impelled the court in the Northern Securities case to
attempt by its decree to annul a co-operative arrangem~nt which assured a single definite policy as
to the management of the two railroads in question
and which policy had directly permitted the sudden
and vast increase in oriental trade;A decree which in the name of competition con-
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demned co-operation; and which stands out preeminently in the history of decided cases as an act
in restraint of trade.
HARRY

CHICAGO,

March 1, 1905.

s. MECARTNEY.
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